

1. Attached is a clean copy of draft "H."

2. You will recall that several sections of the first draft have been ^{entirely} omitted in this ^{the inclusion of} one, ^{THESE} sections having been deemed inappropriate in a C.I.A. paper.

3. As we [] myself) will not have an opportunity to speak to Admiral Stevens to advise him that there were other thoughts (ex: trading the Atlantic for the Mediterranean naval command) which do not appear in this draft - you may wish to mention this fact to him & advise him that ^{he} should he care to hear them

21 May 52

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

This was hand-carried by someone in Mr.
[REDACTED] office and he gave me the following
message for you:

This copy is the same as the rough draft which
Mr. Wisner marked up except for pages 31, 32, 33
and a slight change in first sentence on page 37,
all of which have been approved by the PC Survey
Group which met yesterday afternoon.

[REDACTED]

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DRAFT #4

15 May 1952

OUTLINE OF MEANS PAPER

SECTION I: PROBLEM

SECTION II: BASIC ASSUMPTIONS

SECTION III: GENERAL ANALYSIS

SECTION IV: PROPOSED COURSES OF ACTION
(USSR, Soviet Orbit, Free World,
Far East)

1. Principal Advantages
2. Limiting Factors
3. Feasibility, Emphasis, and Pace

SECTION V: CONCLUSIONS

Priority and Desirability

Annex 1: Points of Conflict

Annex 2: Vulnerabilities

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DRAFT #4

CIA APPROACH TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF A
NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY
(Means Paper)

Note: This is the second of three papers which deals with an approach toward the development of a national psychological strategy with principal emphasis on an appraisal of the most effective means (courses of action).

I. THE PROBLEM

To determine and evaluate the most effective courses of action the U. S. Government could pursue, unilaterally or with its allies, to achieve the reduction of Soviet power and to foster a stronger orientation of the free world toward the U. S.

II. BASIC ASSUMPTIONS

From a CIA/opc point of view with respect to desirability and priority, the courses of action listed should be:

- A. Initiated or implemented within the near-term future (by the end of 1953); and
- B. Considered as the type of actions which will have the greatest impact toward advancement of our national objectives, irrespective of existing capabilities or policy problems.

III. GENERAL ANALYSIS

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III. GENERAL ANALYSIS

CIA/opc has approached the problem of selecting actions which would be most effective in a national strategy by placing principal emphasis on those efforts which will give the greatest support to the attainment of U. S. objectives. The range of choice has been narrowed to those major efforts for which coordination of overt and covert measures of the U. S. Government can best be achieved. One failing in our covert effort to date has been the inability to concentrate limited resources on priority actions and our failure to prevent a wide dissipation of such resources (trained personnel, money, and materials). Necessity initially required the adoption of a containment policy to counter the Soviet threat. We need now to proceed to undertakings that will permit us to be responsive to NSC 68, which envisions the wresting of the initiative from the Soviet Union.

The continuing build-up of strength is a pre-requisite to the achievement of our principal objective, national security, and to the establishment of a durable world order to keep the peace. Essential, therefore, to the undertaking of a national strategic plan is a reaffirmed declaration to free and subjected peoples of our principles and purposes. It must have as strong and ringing an appeal as the "four freedoms," and be understandable in the terms of aspirations of individual human beings living under many circumstances.

The courses of action discussed in this paper are placed generally in a group category of the USSR, the Soviet Orbit, the Free World, and the Far East, rather than discussed as a geographical complex or individual country. The paper has intentionally avoided discussion of courses of action for

Southeast Asia

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25X1 [redacted] since these are parts of a separate panel study of the Psychological Strategy Board and are considered primarily areas of holding action rather than areas of offensive action. Certain of the

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The means selected were those which would fill gaps in our present foreign program and could become the strong supports of a revitalized national strategy. Due regard must be paid to the practicality of keeping our actions within feasible limits and as consistent as possible with the interests, influence, and objectives and capabilities of our major allies. Desirable as it may seem to capture nationalism for Western ends, practical considerations make this goal problematical for the immediate future.

The liberation of the Russian people is not considered to be a feasible undertaking for the next several years. The chances of effecting the detachment of one or more of the satellites is regarded as more feasible, but barring

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but barring developments not presently foreseen, this is not considered a likely near-term possibility. If the successful integration of Germany into a Western European organization can be achieved, some basis may exist for the ultimate evolution of a Eastern European political and economic federation which would not fear the resurgence of a militaristic Germany on one side, and, at the same time, maintain a compatible relationship with the Soviet Union on the other side.

Our principal actions, therefore, should be the continued build-up of strength and the application of increasing psychological pressures against critical targets or areas where dividends are foreseeable.

It should be recognized that it is difficult, at best, to estimate the effectiveness of isolated covert actions without knowing the over-all framework into which they might fit and the amount of mutually related overt effort that will be applied to the same general target.

Although not germane to the immediate problem, we need to take preparatory actions ahead of time to establish our influence in areas of future contention. are areas which should be considered in a long-range strategic plan, rather than wait for developments which would require us to take hasty or opportunistic actions.

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Just as the destruction of Nazism, Fascism, and Japanese imperialism were the objectives of World War II, and the elimination of Kremlin-directed Communism is the objective of the current cold war, we must be prepared to forestall and prevent nascent racism from being the issue of struggle for future generations. With perspicacity and understanding, we should lay the groundwork now which will prevent the issue of racism succeeding the current ideological struggle.

Accepting the philosophy,

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Accepting the philosophy, therefore, that the struggle for world power will extend over the next ten to twenty years, it behooves us to lay the foundations of a strategy which will be most rewarding to us at the time the Communist vs. Free World struggle reaches its climax.

IV. PROPOSED COURSES

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ANNEX 2

PRINCIPAL COMMUNIST VULNERABILITIES

A. Ideological:

1. Atheism -- Anti-Semitism
2. Disregard for the dignity of the individual.
 - a. Slave labor.
 - b. Treatment of political prisoners.
 - c. Unreturned war prisoners.
 - d. Censorship.
3. Contradictions in Communist theories and practices.

B. Political:

1. Extreme centralization of political control.
2. Necessity of political conformity.
3. Communist Party "elite," and frustration of potential new leaders.
4. Variable policies toward subject nationalities and minorities.
5. Soviet bloc representatives exposed to Western influences.

C. Economic:

1. A planned economy which restricts the capacity to meet changing conditions, limits productivity, distribution and efficiency; and fails to exploit the impetus of the profit motive. Certain manifestations of this planned economy are collectivization of farms and regimentation of labor.

2. Certain critical

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2. Certain critical shortages of strategic materials and skilled labor and lack of basic facilities such as internal transportation and a merchant marine.



4. Potential popular dissatisfaction with shortage of consumer goods.

5. Economic strains between Russia and the Satellites.

D. Military:

1. Political influence on military strategy and tactics and periodical purges of military leaders.

2. Nationalistic, rather than political, motivation of the military.

3. USSR occupation forces.

4. Lines of communication.

E. Cultural and Scientific:

1. Subservience of arts and sciences to Communist control.

2. Uncertainty of the entire cultural and scientific base.

3. Shortage of scientists and technicians.

F. Sociological:

1. Social status of women.

2. Continuing lack of progress of the individual's life.

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